help him. But your main reason for trying to help is that you love him and care what happens to him. Which of these two motivating factors (duty and love) would Kant approve of and which would he reject? How might the attitude of someone who embraces feminist ethics differ from Kant's response?

3. Imagine that your town has been hit by a tornado, and you are in a position to rescue only one of a dozen people who are nearby and trapped in demolished houses. The victim who happens to be farthest from you, but still reachable, is your mother. Which of these twelve people should you rescue? Who would you rescue if feminist ethics was your preferred moral outlook? Who would you rescue if you were a strict act-utilitarian?

Endnotes

1. Alison M. Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," *Encyclopedia of Ethics,* ed. Lawrence C. Becker and Charlotte B. Becker (New York: Garland, 1992), 361–70.
2. Jaggar, "Feminist Ethics," 363–64.
3. Carol Gilligan, *In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women's Development* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
4. Annette C. Baier, "The Need for More Than Justice," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy,* suppl. vol. 13 (1988): 56.
5. Virginia Held, *The Ethics of Care* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 10–13.

CHAPTER 11

Virtue Ethics

Consequentialist moral theories are concerned with the consequences of actions, for the consequences determine the moral rightness of conduct. The production of good over evil is the essence of morality. Nonconsequentialist moral theories are concerned with the moral nature of actions, for the right-making characteristics of actions determine the rightness of conduct. Virtue ethics, however, takes a different turn. **Virtue ethics** is a theory of morality that makes virtue the central concern. When confronted with a moral problem, a utilitarian or a Kantian theorist asks, "What should I *do*?" But a virtue ethicist asks, in effect, "What should I *be*?" For the former, moral conduct is primarily a matter of following or applying a moral principle or rule to a particular situation, and morality is mainly duty-based. For the latter, moral conduct is something that emanates from a person's moral virtues—from his or her moral character—not from obedience to moral laws. In this chapter we try to understand both the main attractions and the major criticisms of this virtue-centered approach to ethics and the moral life.

Most modern virtue ethicists trace their theoretical roots back to the ancients, most notably to Aristotle (384–322 B.C.E.). His ethics is a coherent, virtue-based view that interlocks with his broader philosophical concerns—his theories about causation, society, self, education, mind, and metaphysics. Aristotle says the moral life consists not in following moral rules that stipulate right actions but in striving to be a particular kind of person—a virtuous person whose actions stem naturally from virtuous character.

For Aristotle, every living being has an end toward which it naturally aims. Life is teleological; it is meant not just to *be* something but

to *aspire toward* something, to fulfill its proper function. What is the proper aim of human beings? Aristotle argues that the true goal of humans—their greatest good—is **eudaimonia,** which means "happiness" or "flourishing" and refers to the full realization of the good life. To achieve *eudaimonia,* human beings must fulfill the function that is natural and distinctive to them: living fully in accordance with reason. The life of reason entails a life of virtue because the virtues themselves are rational modes of behaving. Thus Aristotle says, "Happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with complete or perfect virtue." The virtuous life both helps human beings *achieve* true happiness and *is the realization of* true happiness. Virtues make you good, *and* they help you have a good life.

A **virtue** is a stable disposition to act and feel according to some ideal or model of excellence. It is a deeply embedded character trait that can affect actions in countless situations. Aristotle distinguishes between intellectual and moral virtues. Intellectual virtues include wisdom, prudence, rationality, and the like. Moral virtues include fairness, benevolence, honesty, loyalty, conscientiousness, and courage. Aristotle believes that intellectual virtues can be taught, just as logic and mathematics can be taught. But moral virtues can be learned only through practice:

> [M]oral virtue comes about as a result of habit. . . . From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature. . . . [B]ut the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well. For the things we have to learn before we can do them, we learn by doing them, e.g. men become builders by building and lyreplayers by playing the lyre; so too we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts.[1]

Aristotle's notion of a moral virtue is what he calls the "**Golden Mean,**" a balance between two behavioral extremes. A moral virtue (courage, for example) is the midpoint between excess (an excess of courage, or foolhardiness) and deficit (a deficit of courage, or cowardice). For Aristotle, then, the virtuous—and happy—life is a life of moderation in all things.

Modern virtue ethicists follow Aristotle's lead in many respects. Some thinkers take issue with his teleological theory of human nature and his concept of a virtue as a mean between opposing tendencies.

And some have offered interesting alternatives to his virtue ethics. But almost all virtue theories owe a debt to Aristotle in one way or another.

Like Aristotle, contemporary thinkers put the emphasis on quality of character and virtues (character traits), rather than on adherence to particular principles or rules of right action. They are concerned with doing the right thing, of course, but moral obligations are derived from virtues. Virtue ethicists are, for example, less likely to ask whether lying is wrong in a particular situation than whether the action or person is honest or dishonest, or whether honesty precludes lying in this case, or whether an exemplar of honesty (say, Gandhi or Jesus) would lie in these same circumstances.

Contemporary virtue ethicists are also Aristotelian in believing that a pure duty-based morality of rule adherence represents a barren, one-dimensional conception of the moral life. First, they agree with Aristotle that the cultivation of virtues is not merely a moral requirement—it is a way (some would say the *only* way) to ensure human flourishing and the good life. Second, they maintain that a full-blown ethics must take into account motives, feelings, intentions, and moral wisdom—factors that they think duty-based morality neglects. This view contrasts dramatically with Kant's duty-based ethics. He argues that to act morally is simply to act out of duty—that is, to do our duty *because* it is our duty. We need not act out of friendship, loyalty, kindness, love, or sympathy. But in virtue ethics, acting from such motivations is a crucial part of acting from a virtuous character, for virtues are stable dispositions that naturally include motivations and feelings. Contrast the action of someone who methodically aids his sick mother solely out of a sense of duty with the person who tends to her mother out of sympathy, love, and loyalty (perhaps in addition to a sense of duty). Most people would probably think that the latter is a better model of the moral life, while the former seems incomplete.

VIRTUE IN ACTION

If moral rules are secondary in virtue ethics, how does a virtue ethicist make moral decisions or guide his or her conduct or judge the behavior of others? Suppose Helen, a conscientious practitioner of Aristotelian virtue ethics, hears William lie to a friend to avoid paying a debt. She does not have to appeal to a moral rule such as "Do not lie" to know

that William's action is an instance of dishonesty (or untruthfulness) and that William himself is dishonest. She can see by his actions that he lacks the virtue of honesty.

But to Helen, honesty is more than just a character trait: it is also an essential part of human happiness and flourishing. In her case, honesty is a virtue that she has cultivated for years by behaving honestly and truthfully in a variety of situations (not just in cases of lying). She has taken such trouble in part because cultivating this virtue has helped her become the kind of person she wants to be. She has developed the disposition to act honestly; acting honestly is part of who she is. She sometimes relies on moral rules (or moral rules of thumb) to make moral decisions, but she usually does not need them, because her actions naturally reflect her virtuous character.

In addition, Helen's trained virtues not only guide her actions, but they also inspire the motivations and feelings appropriate to those actions. Helen avoids dishonest dealings, and she does so because this is what a virtuous person would do, because she has compassion and sympathy for innocent people who are cheated, and because dishonesty is not conducive to human happiness and flourishing.

What guidance can Helen obtain in her strivings toward a moral ideal? Like most virtue ethicists, she looks to moral exemplars—people who embody the virtues and inspire others to follow in their steps. (For exemplars of honesty, Helen has several moral heroes to choose from—Socrates, Gandhi, Jesus, the Buddha, Thomas Aquinas, and many others.) As the philosopher Louis Pojman says of virtue systems,

> The primary focus is not on abstract reason but on ideal types of persons or on actual ideal persons. Discovering the proper moral example and imitating that person or ideal type thus replace casuistic reason as the most significant aspects of the moral life. Eventually, the apprentice-like training in virtue gained by imitating the ideal model results in a virtuous person who spontaneously does what is good.[2]

EVALUATING VIRTUE ETHICS

A case can be made for virtue ethics based on how well it seems to explain important aspects of the moral life. Some philosophers, for

example, claim that the virtue approach offers a more plausible explanation of the role of motivation in moral actions than duty-based moral systems do. According to Kant's theory, your conduct may be morally acceptable even if you, say, save a friend's life out of a sense of duty alone (that is, without any sincere regard for your friend). But this motivation—your calculating sense of duty—seems a very cold and anemic motivation indeed. Virtue theorists would say that a more natural and morally appropriate response would be to save your friend primarily out of compassion, love, loyalty, or something similar—and these motives are just what we would expect from a virtuous person acting from fully developed virtues.

Some philosophers also remind us that virtue ethics puts primary emphasis on being a good person and living a good life, a life of happiness and flourishing. They say that these aims are obviously central to the moral life and should be part of any adequate theory of morality. Duty-based moral systems, however, pay much less attention to these essential elements.

Many duty-based theorists are willing to concede that there is some truth in both of these claims. They believe that motivation for moral action cannot be derived entirely from considerations of duty, just as appropriate motivation cannot be based solely on virtuous character. And they recognize that the moral life involves more than merely honoring rules and principles. As Aristotle insists, there should be room for moral achievement in morality, for striving toward moral ideals. But even if these claims of the virtue ethicist are true, it does not follow that traditional virtue ethics is the best moral theory or that an ethics without duties or principles is plausible.

Virtue-based ethics seems to meet the minimum requirement of coherence, and it appears to be generally consistent with our commonsense moral judgments and moral experience. Nevertheless critics have taken it to task, with most of the strongest criticisms centering on alleged problems with applying the theory—in other words, with usefulness (Criterion 3).

The critics' main contention is that appeals to virtues or virtuous character without reference to principles of duty cannot give us any useful guidance in deciding what to do. Suppose we are trying to decide what to do when a desperately poor stranger steals money from us. Should we have him arrested? Give him even more money? Ignore the whole affair? According to virtue ethics, we should do what a virtuous

person would do, or do what moral exemplars such as Jesus or the Buddha would do, or do what is benevolent or conscientious. But what exactly *would* a virtuous person do? Or what precisely *is* the benevolent or conscientious action? As many philosophers see it, the problem is that virtue ethics says that the right action is the one performed by the virtuous person and that the virtuous person is the one who performs the right action. But this is to argue in a circle and to give us no help in figuring out what to do. To avoid this circularity, they say, we must appeal to some kind of moral standard or principle to evaluate the action itself. Before we can decide if a person is virtuous, we need to judge if her actions are right or wrong—and such judgments take us beyond virtue ethics.

Some argue in a similar vein by pointing out that a person may possess all of the proper virtues and still be unable to tell right from wrong actions. Dr. Z may be benevolent and just but still not know if stem cell research should be continued or stopped, or if he should help a terminal patient commit suicide, or if he should perform a late-term abortion. Likewise, we know that it is possible for a virtuous person to act entirely from virtue and still commit an immoral act. This shows, critics say, that the rightness of actions does not necessarily (or invariably) depend on the content of one's character. We seem to have independent moral standards—independent of character considerations—by which we judge the moral permissibility of actions.

The virtue theorist can respond to these criticisms by asserting that plenty of moral guidance is to be had in statements about virtues and vices. According to virtue ethicist Rosalind Hursthouse,

> [A] great deal of specific action guidance could be found in rules employing the virtue and vice terms ("v-rules") such as "Do what is honest/charitable; do not do what is dishonest/uncharitable." (It is a noteworthy feature of our virtue and vice vocabulary that, although our list of generally recognised virtue terms is comparatively short, our list of vice terms is remarkably, and usefully, long, far exceeding anything that anyone who thinks in terms of standard deontological rules has ever come up with. Much invaluable action guidance comes from avoiding courses of action that would be irresponsible, feckless, lazy, inconsiderate, uncooperative, harsh, intolerant, selfish, mercenary, indiscreet, tactless, arrogant . . . and on and on.)[3]

Hursthouse believes we can discover our moral duties by examining terms that refer to virtues and vices, because moral guidance is implicit in these terms.

Another usefulness criticism crops up because of apparent conflicts between virtues. What should you do if you have to choose between performing or not performing a particular action, and each option involves the same two virtues but in contradictory ways? Suppose your best friend is on trial for murder, and under oath you must testify about what you know of the case, but what you know will incriminate her. The question is, Should you lie? If you lie to save your friend, you will be loyal but dishonest. If you tell the truth, you will be honest but disloyal. The virtues of loyalty and honesty conflict; you simply cannot be both loyal and honest. Virtue ethics says you should act as a virtuous person would. But such advice gives you no guidance on how to do that in this particular case. You need to know which virtue is more important in this situation, but virtue ethics does not seem to provide a useful answer.

The proponent of virtue ethics has a ready reply to this criticism: Some duty-based moral theories, such as Kantian ethics, are also troubled by conflicts (conflicts of rules or principles, for example). Obviously the existence of such conflicts is not a fatal flaw in duty-based ethics, and so it must not be in virtue approaches either. When principles seem to conflict, the duty-based theorist must determine if the conflict is real and, if so, if it can be resolved (by, say, weighting one principle more than another). Virtue ethics, the argument goes, can exercise the same kind of options. Some might observe, however, that incorporating a weighting rule or similar standard into virtue ethics seems to make the theory a blend of duty-based and virtue-based features.

LEARNING FROM VIRTUE ETHICS

Why does the ancient moral tradition of virtue ethics persist—and not just persist but thrive, even enjoying a revival in modern times? Many thinkers would say that virtue ethics is alive and well because it is sustained by an important ethical truth: virtue and character are large, unavoidable constituents of our moral experience. As moral creatures, we regularly judge the moral permissibility of actions *and* assess the

goodness of character. If someone commits an immoral act (kills an innocent human being, for example), it matters to us whether the act was committed out of compassion (as in euthanasia), benevolence, loyalty, revenge, rage, or ignorance. The undeniable significance of virtue in morality has obliged many philosophers to consider how best to accommodate virtues into their principle-based theories of morality or to recast those theories entirely to give virtues a larger role.

The rise of virtue ethics has also forced many thinkers to reexamine the place of principles in morality. If we have virtues, do we need principles? Most philosophers would probably say yes and agree with the philosopher William Frankena that "principles without traits [virtues] are impotent and traits without principles are blind":

> To be or to do, that is the question. Should we construe morality as primarily a following of certain principles or as primarily a cultivation of certain dispositions and traits? Must we choose? It is hard to see how a morality of principles can get off the ground except through the development of dispositions to act in accordance with its principles, else all motivation to act on them must be of an *ad hoc* kind, either prudential or impulsively altruistic.[4]

Kant would have us act out of duty alone, granting no bonus points for acting from virtue. Utilitarianism doesn't require, but also doesn't reject, virtuous motives. Yet virtue seems to be as much a part of our moral experience as moral disagreements, moral errors, and moral reasoning. The question is not whether we should care about virtues, but how much we should care and how we can incorporate them into our lives.

KEYWORDS

eudaimonia—Greek for "happiness," or "flourishing."
Golden Mean—Aristotle's notion of a moral virtue as a balance between two behavioral extremes, such as courage and cowardice.
virtue—A stable disposition to act and feel according to some ideal or model of excellence.
virtue ethics—A theory of morality that makes virtue the central concern.

EXERCISES

Review Questions

1. How does virtue ethics differ from duty-based ethics?
2. In what way is Aristotle's virtue ethics considered teleological?
3. What, according to Aristotle, must humans do to achieve *eudaimonia*?
4. Give three examples of moral virtues. Give two examples of intellectual virtues.
5. What important elements do virtue ethicists think are missing from traditional duty-based ethics?
6. How do virtue ethicists use moral exemplars?
7. Does virtue ethics seem to offer a more plausible explanation of the role of motivation in moral actions than does Kantian ethics? If so, how?
8. What is the chief argument against virtue ethics? How can the virtue ethicist respond?
9. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Aristotle's virtue ethics theory?
10. What does Aristotle mean when he says that the virtuous life helps us *achieve* happiness and *is* happiness?

ETHICAL DILEMMAS

Explain how virtue ethics could be applied in the following scenarios to determine the proper course of action.

1. You are walking across town, and a homeless person bumps into you, takes your wallet, and runs away. What would a virtuous person do in this instance? Should the guiding virtue be compassion? fairness? honesty?
2. You are a physician treating a terminally ill woman who is in a great deal of pain that no drug can relieve. She says she has lived a full life and now wants you to end her anguish by helping her die quickly and quietly. She has no known relatives. The American Medical Association's code of ethics absolutely forbids physician-assisted suicide, and the hospital where she is a patient has a similar policy. But you want to alleviate her agony and give her a chance to die with dignity. What would a virtuous person do?
3. Your father has stolen $30,000 from his employer to pay for surgery that his sister desperately needs. Without the surgery, she will be dead

within six months. Only you know about his crime. You also know that no one will ever know who stole the money unless you report the theft to the authorities. Should you turn your father in to the police? Should you keep quiet about the matter? What would a virtuous person do?

Endnotes

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2. Louis P. Pojman, *Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong,* 4th ed. (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2002), 165.
3. Rosalind Hursthouse, "Virtue Ethics," *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2003 ed.), ed. Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/ethics-virtue/.
4. William K. Frankena, *Ethics,* 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 65.

CHAPTER 12

A Moral Theory

By now you know that we are all chronic moral theorizers. We can't help ourselves. We usually operate on the ground level of ethics, making judgments about the rightness or wrongness of particular actions or the moral worth of particular people or motives, trying to align our lives with moral norms that we think rest on a solid footing. But sometimes we must take a bird's-eye view of morality to see how these particulars are related, whether they reveal a pattern that informs the moral life, and whether the moral principles we embrace are really worth embracing. In other words, we *theorize.*

In this chapter, I do some of this big-picture theorizing. I try to work out a plausible moral theory of obligation, an explanation of what makes an action right or wrong. I base this theory on what I consider the best aspects of the moral theories discussed earlier and on the elements of the moral life in which we have the greatest confidence.

MORAL COMMON SENSE

As we have seen, the most influential theories of the past—utilitarianism, Kantian ethics, natural law theory, social contract theory, and virtue ethics—offer invaluable moral insights. But each one overlooks at least one feature that seems vital to morality and to any adequate moral theory. Some leave out the consequences of actions, some the claims of autonomy and rights, and some the demands of justice. I think the absence of these elements constitutes a disabling flaw for

family to move, which would be an extreme hardship for them. From a moral point of view, the family should be allowed to stay on their farm. Which view should take precedence?

Endnotes

1. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty*, 1859.
2. Paul W. Taylor, *Principles of Ethics: An Introduction* (Encino, CA: Dickenson, 1975), 9–10.
3. G. W. von Leibniz, "Discourse on Metaphysics," in *Selections*, ed. Philip P. Wiener (New York: Scribner, 1951), 292.
4. James Rachels, *The Elements of Moral Philosophy*, 4th ed. (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2003), 51.

CHAPTER 2

Relativism and Emotivism

Consider the following: Abdulla Yones killed his sixteen-year-old daughter Heshu in their apartment in west London. The murder was yet another example of an "honor killing," an ancient tradition still practiced in many parts of the world. Using a kitchen knife, Yones stabbed Heshu eleven times and slit her throat. He later declared that he *had* to kill her to expunge a stain from his family, a stain that Heshu had caused by her outrageous behavior. What was outrageous behavior to Yones, however, would seem to many Westerners to be typical teenage antics, annoying but benign. Heshu's precise offense against her family's honor is unclear, but the possibilities include wearing makeup, having a boyfriend, and showing an independent streak that would be thought perfectly normal throughout the West. In some countries, honor killings are sometimes endorsed by the local community or even given the tacit blessing of the state.

What do you think of this time-honored way of dealing with family conflicts? Specifically, what is your opinion regarding the *morality* of honor killing? Your response to this question is likely to reveal not only your view of honor killing but your overall approach to morality as well. Suppose your response is something like this: "Honor killing is morally *wrong*—wrong no matter where it's done or who does it." With this statement, you implicitly embrace moral **objectivism**, the doctrine that some moral norms or principles are valid for everyone—*universal*, in other words—regardless of how cultures may differ in their moral outlooks. You need not hold, however, that the objective principles are rigid rules with no exceptions (a view known as *absolutism*) or that they must be applied in exactly the same way in every situation and culture.

On the other hand, let us say that you assess the case like this: "In societies that approve of honor killing, the practice is morally right; in those that do not approve, it is morally wrong. My society approves of honor killing, so it is morally right." If you believe what you say, then you are a cultural relativist. **Cultural relativism** is the view that an action is morally right if one's culture approves of it. Moral rightness and wrongness are therefore relative to cultures. So in one culture, an action may be morally right; in another culture, it may be morally wrong.

Perhaps you prefer an even narrower view of morality, and so you say, "Honor killing may be right for you, but it is most certainly not right for me." If you mean this literally, then you are committed to another kind of relativism called **subjective relativism**—the view that an action is morally right if one approves of it. Moral rightness and wrongness are relative not to cultures but to individuals. An action then can be right for you but wrong for someone else. Your approving of an action makes it right. There is therefore no objective morality, and cultural norms do not make right or wrong—individuals make right or wrong.

Finally, imagine that you wish to take a different tack regarding the subject of honor killing. You say, "I abhor the practice of honor killing," but you believe that in uttering these words you are saying nothing that is true or false. You believe that despite what your statement seems to mean, you are simply expressing your emotions. You therefore hold to **emotivism**—the view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are instead expressions of emotions or attitudes. So in your sentence about honor killing, you are not stating a fact—you are merely emoting and possibly trying to influence someone's behavior. Even when emotivists express a more specific preference regarding other people's behavior—by saying, for instance, "No one should commit an honor killing"—they are still not making a factual claim. They are simply expressing a preference, and perhaps hoping to persuade other people to see things their way.

These four replies represent four distinctive perspectives (though certainly not the only perspectives) on the meaning and import of moral judgments. Moreover, they are not purely theoretical but real and relevant. People actually live their lives (or try to) as moral objectivists or relativists, or some strange and inconsistent mixture of these. (There is an excellent chance, for example, that you were raised as an objectivist but now accept some form of relativism, or that you even try to hold to objectivism in some instances and relativism in others.)

In any case, the question that you should ask—and that moral philosophy can help you answer—is not whether you in fact accept any of these views, but whether you are justified in doing so. Let us see, then, where an examination of reasons for and against them will lead.

SUBJECTIVE RELATIVISM

What view of morality could be more tempting (and convenient) than the notion that an action is right if someone approves of it? Subjective relativism says that action X is right for Ann if she approves of it yet wrong for Greg if he disapproves of it. Thus action X can be both right and wrong—right for Ann but wrong for Greg. A person's approval of an action *makes it right* for that person. Action X is not *objectively* right (or wrong). It is right (or wrong) relative to individuals. In this way, moral rightness becomes a matter of personal taste. If Ann thinks strawberry ice cream tastes good, then it is good (for her). If Greg thinks strawberry ice cream tastes bad, then it is bad (for him). There is no such thing as strawberry ice cream tasting good objectively or generally. Likewise, the morality of an action depends on Ann and Greg's moral tastes.

Many people claim they are subjective relativists, until they realize the implications of the doctrine—implications that are at odds with our commonsense moral experience. First, subjective relativism implies that in the rendering of any moral opinion, each person is incapable of being in error. Each of us is *morally infallible*. If we approve of an action—and we are sincere in our approval—then that action is morally right. We literally cannot be mistaken about this, because our approval makes the action right. If we say that inflicting pain on an innocent child for no reason is right (that is, we approve of such an action), then the action is right. Our moral judgment is correct, and it cannot be otherwise. Yet if anything is obvious about our moral experience, it is that we are *not* infallible. We sometimes *are* mistaken in our moral judgments. We are, after all, not gods.

From all accounts, Adolf Hitler approved of (and ordered) the extermination of vast numbers of innocent people, including six million Jews. If so, by the lights of subjective relativism, his facilitating those deaths was morally right. It seems that the totalitarian leader Pol Pot

approved of his murdering more than a million innocent people in Cambodia. If so, it was right for him to murder those people. But it seems obvious that what these men did was wrong, and their approving of their own actions did not make the actions right. Because subjective relativism suggests otherwise, it is a dubious doctrine.

Another obvious feature of our commonsense moral experience is that from time to time we have moral disagreements. Maria says that capital punishment is right, but Carlos says that it is wrong. This seems like a perfectly clear case of two people disagreeing about the morality of capital punishment. Subjective relativism, however, implies that such disagreements cannot happen. Subjective relativism says that when Maria states that capital punishment is right, she is just saying that she approves of it. And when Carlos states that capital punishment is wrong, he is just saying that he disapproves of it. They are not really disagreeing, merely describing their attitudes toward capital punishment. In effect, Maria is saying "This is my attitude on the subject," and Carlos is saying "Here is my attitude on the subject." These two claims are not opposed to one another, because they are about different subjects. So both statements could be true. Maria and Carlos might as well be discussing how strawberry ice cream tastes to each of them, for nothing that Maria says could contradict what Carlos says. However, because genuine disagreement is a fact of our moral life, and subjective relativism is inconsistent with this fact, the doctrine is implausible.

In practice, subjective relativism is a difficult view to hold consistently. At times, of course, you can insist that an action is right for you but wrong for someone else. But you may also find yourself saying something like "Pol Pot committed absolutely heinous acts; he was evil" or "What Hitler did was wrong"—and what you mean is that what Pol Pot and Hitler did was objectively wrong, not just wrong relative to you. Such slides from subjective relativism to objectivism suggest a conflict between these two perspectives and the need to resolve it through critical reasoning.

CULTURAL RELATIVISM

To many people, the idea that morality is relative to culture is obvious. It seems obvious primarily because modern sociology has left no doubt that people's moral judgments differ from culture to culture.

The moral judgments of people in other cultures are often shockingly different from our own. In some societies, it is morally permissible to kill infants at birth, burn widows alive with the bodies of their husbands, steal and commit acts of treachery, surgically remove the clitorises of young girls for no medical reason, kill one's elderly parents, have multiple husbands or wives, and make up for someone's death by murdering others. Among some people, it has been considered morally acceptable to kill those of a different sexual orientation, lynch persons with a different skin color, and allow children to die by refusing to give them available medical treatment. (These latter acts have all been practiced in subcultures within the United States, so not all such cultural differences happen far from home.) There is only a small step from acknowledging this moral diversity among cultures to the conclusion that cultures determine moral rightness and that objective morality is a myth.

The philosopher Walter T. Stace (1886–1967) illustrates how easily this conclusion has come to many in Western societies:

> It was easy enough to believe in a single absolute morality in older times when there was no anthropology, when all humanity was divided clearly into two groups, Christian peoples and the "heathen." Christian peoples knew and possessed the one true morality. The rest were savages whose moral ideas could be ignored. But all this changed. Greater knowledge has brought greater tolerance. We can no longer exalt our own moralities as alone true, while dismissing all other moralities as false or inferior. The investigations of anthropologists have shown that there exist side by side in the world a bewildering variety of moral codes. On this topic endless volumes have been written, masses of evidence piled up. Anthropologists have ransacked the Melanesian Islands, the jungles of New Guinea, the steppes of Siberia, the deserts of Australia, the forests of central Africa, and have brought back with them countless examples of weird, extravagant, and fantastic "moral" customs with which to confound us. We learn that all kinds of horrible practices are, in this, that, or the other place, regarded as essential to virtue. We find that there is nothing, or next to nothing, which has always and everywhere been regarded as morally good by all men. Where then is our universal morality? Can we, in face of all this evidence, deny that it is nothing but an empty dream?[1]

Here, Stace spells out in rough form the most common argument for cultural relativism, an inference from differences in the moral beliefs of cultures to the conclusion that cultures make morality. Before we conclude that objectivism is in fact an empty dream, we should state the argument more precisely and examine it closely. We can lay out the argument like this:

1. People's judgments about right and wrong differ from culture to culture.
2. If people's judgments about right and wrong differ from culture to culture, then right and wrong are relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles.
3. Therefore, right and wrong are relative to culture, and there are no objective moral principles.

A good argument gives us good reason to accept its conclusion. An argument is good if its logic is solid (the conclusion follows logically from the premises) *and* the premises are true. So is the foregoing argument a good one? We can see right away that the logic is in fact solid. That is, the argument is valid: the conclusion does indeed follow from the premises. The question then becomes whether the premises are true. As we have seen, Premise 1 is most certainly true. People's judgments about right and wrong do vary from culture to culture. But what of Premise 2? Does the diversity of views about right and wrong among cultures show that right and wrong are determined by culture, that there are no universal moral truths? There are good reasons to think this premise false.

Premise 2 says that because there are disagreements among cultures about right and wrong, there must not be any universal standards of right and wrong. But even if the moral judgments of people in various cultures do differ, such difference in itself does not show that morality is relative to culture. Just because people in different cultures have different views about morality, their disagreement does not prove that no view can be objectively correct—no more than people's disagreements about the size of a house show that no one's opinion about it can be objectively true. Suppose culture A endorses infanticide, but culture B does not. Such a disagreement does not demonstrate that both cultures are equally correct or that there is no objectively correct answer. After all, it is possible that infanticide is objectively right (or wrong) and that the relevant moral beliefs of either culture A or culture B are false.

Another reason to doubt the truth of Premise 2 comes from questioning how deep the disagreements among cultures really are. Judgments about the rightness of actions obviously do vary across cultures. But people can differ in their moral judgments not just because they accept different moral principles, but also because they have divergent *nonmoral* beliefs. They may actually embrace the *same* moral principles, but their moral judgments conflict because their nonmoral beliefs lead them to apply those principles in very different ways. If so, the diversity of moral judgments across cultures does not necessarily indicate deep disagreements over fundamental moral principles or standards. Here is a classic example:

> [T]he story is told of a culture in which a son is regarded as obligated to kill his father when the latter reaches age sixty. Given just this much information about the culture and the practice in question it is tempting to conclude that the members of that culture differ radically from members of our culture in their moral beliefs and attitudes. We, after all, believe it is immoral to take a human life, and regard patricide as especially wrong. But suppose that in the culture we are considering, those who belong to it believe (a) that at the moment of death one enters heaven; (b) one's physical and mental condition in the afterlife is exactly what it is at the moment of death; and (c) men are at the peak of their physical and mental powers when they are sixty. Then what appeared at first to be peculiarities in moral outlook on the part of the cultural group in question regarding the sanctity of life and respect for parents, turn out to be located rather in a nonmoral outlook of the group. A man in that culture who kills his father is doing so out of concern for the latter's well-being—to prevent him, for example, from spending eternity blind or senile. It is not at all clear that, if we shared the relevant nonmoral beliefs of this other culture, we would not believe with them that sons should kill their fathers at the appropriate time.[2]

To find similar examples, we need not search for the exotic. In Western cultures we have the familiar case of abortion, an issue hotly debated among those who at first glance appear to be disagreeing about moral principles. But in fact the disputants agree about the moral principle involved: that murder (unjustly killing a person) is morally wrong. What

they do disagree about is a nonmoral factual matter—whether the fetus is an entity that can be murdered (that is, whether it is a person). Disagreement over the nonmoral facts masks substantial agreement on fundamental moral standards.

The work of several anthropologists provides some evidence for these kinds of disagreements, as well as for the existence of cross-cultural moral agreement in general. The social psychologist Solomon Asch, for instance, maintains that differing moral judgments among societies often arise when the same moral principles are operating but the particulars of cultural situations vary.[3] Other observers claim that across numerous diverse cultures we can find many common moral elements, such as prohibitions against murder, lying, incest, and adultery and obligations of fairness, reciprocity, and consideration toward parents and children.[4] Some philosophers argue that a core set of moral values—including, for example, truth telling and prohibitions against murder—must be universal, otherwise cultures would not survive.

These points demonstrate that Premise 2 of the argument for cultural relativism is false. The argument therefore gives us no good reasons to believe that an action is right simply because one's culture approves of it.

For many people, however, the failure of the argument for cultural relativism may be beside the point. They find the doctrine appealing mainly because it seems to promote the humane and enlightened attitude of tolerance toward other cultures. Broad expanses of history are drenched with blood and marked by cruelty because of the evil of intolerance—religious, racial, political, and social. Tolerance therefore seems a supreme virtue, and cultural relativism appears to provide a justification and vehicle for it. After all, if all cultures are morally equal, does not cultural relativism both entail and promote tolerance?

We should hope that tolerance does reign in a pluralistic world, but there is no necessary connection between tolerance and cultural relativism. For one thing, cultural relativists cannot consistently advocate tolerance. To advocate tolerance is to advocate an objective moral value. But if tolerance is an objective moral value, then cultural relativism must be false, because it says that there are no objective moral values. So instead of justifying tolerance toward all, cultural relativism actually undercuts universal tolerance. Moreover, according to cultural relativism, intolerance can be justified just as easily as tolerance can. If a culture approves of intolerance, then intolerance is right for that culture. If a culture approves of tolerance, then tolerance is right for that culture. Cultural relativists are thus committed to the view that intolerance can in fact be justified, and they cannot consistently claim that tolerance is morally right everywhere.

At this point we are left with no good reasons to believe that cultural relativism is true. But the problems for the doctrine go deeper than this. Like subjective relativism, cultural relativism has several implications that render it highly implausible.

First, as is the case with subjective relativism, cultural relativism implies moral infallibility. A culture simply cannot be mistaken about a moral issue. If it approves of an action, then that action is morally right, and there is no possibility of error as long as the culture's approval is genuine. But, of course, cultural infallibility in moral matters is flagrantly implausible, just as individual infallibility is. At one time or another, cultures have sanctioned witch burning, slavery, genocide, racism, rape, human sacrifice, and religious persecution. Does it make any sense to say that they could not have been mistaken about the morality of these actions?

Cultural relativism also has the peculiar consequence that social reformers of every sort would *always be wrong*. Their culture would be the ultimate authority on moral matters, so if they disagree with their culture, they could not possibly be right. If their culture approves of genocide, then genocide would be right, and anti-genocide reformers would be wrong to oppose the practice. In this upside-down world, the anti-genocide reformers would be immoral and the genocidal culture would be the real paragon of righteousness. Reformers such as Martin Luther King Jr., Mahatma Gandhi, Mary Wollstonecraft (champion of women's rights), and Frederick Douglass (American abolitionist) would be great crusaders—for immorality. Our moral experience, however, suggests that cultural relativism has matters exactly backward. Social reformers have often been right when they claimed their cultures were wrong, and this fact suggests that cultural relativism is wrong about morality.

Wherever cultural relativism holds, if you have a disagreement with your culture about the rightness of an action, you automatically lose. You are in error by definition. But what about a disagreement among members of the same society? What would such a disagreement amount to? It amounts to something very strange, according to cultural relativism. When two people in the same culture disagree on a moral issue, what

they are really disagreeing about—the only thing they can rationally disagree about—is whether their society endorses a particular view. After all, society makes actions right by approving or disapproving of them. According to cultural relativism, if René and Michel (both members of society X) are disagreeing about capital punishment, their disagreement must actually be about whether society X approves of capital punishment. Because right and wrong are determined by one's culture, René and Michel are disagreeing about what society X says. But this view of moral disagreement is dubious, to say the least. When we have a moral disagreement, we do not think that the crux of it is whether our society approves of an action. We do not think that deciding a moral issue is simply a matter of polling the public to see which way opinion leans. We do not think that René and Michel will ever find out whether capital punishment is morally permissible by consulting public opinion. Determining whether an action is right is a very different thing from determining what most people think. This odd consequence of cultural relativism suggests that the doctrine is flawed.

One of the more disturbing implications of cultural relativism is that cultures cannot be legitimately criticized from the outside. If a culture approves of the actions that it performs, then those actions are morally right regardless of what other cultures have to say about the matter. One society's practices are as morally justified as any other's, as long as the practices are socially sanctioned. This consequence of cultural relativism may not seem too worrisome when the societies in question are long dead. But it takes on a different tone when the societies are closer to us in time. Consider the 1994 genocide committed in Rwanda in which nearly a million people died. Suppose the killers' society (their tribe) approved of the murders. Then the genocide was morally justified. If you are a cultural relativist, you cannot legitimately condemn these monstrous deeds. Because they were approved by their respective societies, they were morally justified. They were just as morally justified as the socially sanctioned and life-saving activities of Albert Schweitzer, Jonas Salk, or Florence Nightingale. But all of this seems implausible. We do in fact sometimes criticize other cultures and believe that it is legitimate to do so.

Contrary to the popular view, rejecting cultural relativism (embracing moral objectivism) does not entail intolerance. In fact, it provides a plausible starting point for tolerance. A moral objectivist realizes

that she can legitimately criticize other cultures, and that people of other cultures can legitimately criticize her culture. A recognition of this fact, together with an objectivist's sense of fallibility, can lead her to an openness to criticism of her own culture and to acceptance of everyone's right to disagree.

We not only criticize other cultures, but we also compare the past with the present. We compare the actions of the past with those of the present and judge whether moral progress has been made. We see that slavery has been abolished, that we no longer burn witches, that we recognize racism as evil, and then we judge that these changes represent moral progress. For moral relativists, however, there is no objective standard by which to compare the ways of the past with the ways of the present. Societies of the past approved or disapproved of certain practices, and contemporary societies approve or disapprove of them, and no transcultural moral assessments can be made. But if there is such a thing as moral progress, then there must be some cross-cultural moral yardstick by which we can evaluate actions. There must be objective standards by which we can judge that the actions of the present are better than those of the past. If there are no objective moral standards, our judging that we are in fact making moral progress is hard to explain.

Finally, there is a fundamental difficulty concerning the application of cultural relativism to moral questions: the doctrine is nearly impossible to use. The problem is that cultural relativism applies to societies (or social groups), but we all belong to several societies, and there is no way to choose which one is the proper one. What society do you belong to if you are an Italian American Buddhist living in Atlanta, Georgia, who is a member of the National Organization for Women and a breast cancer support group? The hope of cultural relativists is that they can use the doctrine to make better, more enlightened moral decisions. But this society-identification problem seems to preclude any moral decisions, let alone enlightened ones.

What, then, can we conclude from our examination of cultural relativism? We have found that the basic argument for the view fails; we therefore have no good reasons to believe that the doctrine is true. Beyond that, we have good grounds for thinking the doctrine false. Its surprising implications regarding moral infallibility, moral reformers, moral progress, the nature of moral disagreements within societies, and the possibility of cross-cultural criticism show it to be highly implausible. The crux

of the matter is that cultural relativism does a poor job of explaining some important features of our moral experience. A far better explanation of these features is that some form of moral objectivism is true.

EMOTIVISM

The commonsense view of moral judgments is that they ascribe moral properties to such things as actions and people and that they are therefore statements that can be true or false. This view of moral judgments is known as *cognitivism*. The opposing view, called *noncognitivism*, denies that moral judgments are statements that can be true or false; rather, moral judgments do not ascribe properties to anything. Probably the most famous noncognitivist view is emotivism, which says that moral judgments cannot be true or false because they do not make any claims—they merely express emotions or attitudes. For the emotivist, moral utterances are something akin to exclamations that simply express approving or disapproving feelings: "Violence against women—disgusting!" or "Shoplifting—love it!"

The English philosopher A. J. Ayer (1910–1989), an early champion of emotivism, is clear and blunt about what a moral utterance such as "Stealing money is wrong" signifies. This sentence, he says,

> expresses no proposition which can be either true or false. It is as if I had written "Stealing money!!"—where the shape and thickness of the exclamation marks show, by a suitable convention, that a special sort of moral disapproval is the feeling which is being expressed. It is clear that there is nothing said here which can be true or false. . . . For in saying that a certain type of action is right or wrong, I am not making any factual statement, not even a statement about my own state of mind.[5]

If moral judgments are about feelings and not the truth or falsity of moral assertions, then ethics is a very different sort of inquiry than most people imagine. As Ayer says,

> [A]s ethical judgments are mere expressions of feeling, there can be no way of determining the validity of any ethical system, and, indeed, no sense in asking whether any such system is true. All that one may legitimately enquire in this connection is, What are the moral habits of a given person or group of people, and what causes them to have precisely those habits and feelings? And this enquiry falls wholly within the scope of the existing social sciences.[6]

The emotivist points out that although moral utterances express feelings and attitudes, they also function to influence people's attitudes and behavior. So the sentence "Stealing money is wrong" not only expresses feelings of disapproval, it also can influence others to have similar feelings and act accordingly.

Emotivists also take an unusual position on moral disagreements. They maintain that moral disagreements are not conflicts of beliefs, as is the case when one person asserts that something is the case and another person asserts that it is not the case. Instead, moral disagreements are *disagreements in attitude*. Jane has positive feelings or a favorable attitude toward abortion, but Ellen has negative feelings or an unfavorable attitude toward abortion. The disagreement is emotive, not cognitive. Jane may say "Abortion is right," and Ellen may say "Abortion is wrong," but they are not really disagreeing over the facts. They are expressing conflicting attitudes and trying to influence each other's attitude and behavior.

Philosophers have criticized emotivism on several grounds, and this emotivist analysis of disagreement has been a prime target. As you might suspect, the concern is that this notion of disagreement is radically different from our ordinary view. Like subjective relativism, emotivism implies that disagreements in the usual sense are impossible. People cannot disagree over the moral facts, because there are no moral facts. But we tend to think that when we disagree with someone on a moral issue, there really is a conflict of statements about what is the case. Of course, when we are involved in a conflict of beliefs, we may also experience conflicting attitudes. But we do not think that we are *only* experiencing a disagreement in attitudes.

Emotivism also provides a curious account of how reasons function in moral discourse. Our commonsense view is that a moral judgment is the kind of thing that makes a claim about moral properties and that such a claim can be supported by reasons. If someone asserts "Euthanasia is wrong," we may sensibly ask him what reasons he has for believing this claim. If he replies that there are no reasons to back up his claim or that moral utterances are not the kind of things that

can be supported by reasons, we would probably think that he misunderstood the question or the nature of morality. For the emotivist, "moral" reasons have a very different function. They are intended not to support statements (since there are no moral statements) but to influence the emotions or attitudes of others. Because moral utterances express emotions or attitudes, "presenting reasons" is a matter of offering nonmoral facts that can influence those emotions and attitudes. Suppose A has a favorable attitude toward abortion, and B has an unfavorable one (that is, A and B are having a disagreement in attitude). For A, to present reasons is to provide information that might cause B to have a more favorable attitude toward abortion.

This conception of the function of reasons, however, implies that good reasons can encompass *any* nonmoral facts that alter someone's attitude. In this view, the relevance of these facts to the judgment at hand is beside the point. The essential criterion is whether the adduced facts are sufficiently influential. They need not have any logical or cognitive connection to the moral judgment to be changed. They may, for example, appeal to someone's ignorance, arrogance, racism, or fear. But we ordinarily suppose that reasons *should* be relevant to the cognitive content of moral judgments. Moreover, we normally make a clear distinction between influencing someone's attitudes and showing (by providing relevant reasons) that a claim is true—a distinction that emotivism cannot make.

The final implication of emotivism—that there is no such thing as goodness or badness—is also problematic. We cannot legitimately claim that anything is good or bad, because these properties do not exist. To declare that something is good is just to express positive emotions or a favorable attitude toward it. We may say that pain is bad, but badness (or goodness) is not a feature of pain. Our saying that pain is bad is just an expression of our unfavorable attitude toward pain.

Suppose a six-year-old girl is living in a small village in Syria during the civil war between President Bashar al-Assad's Baathist government and rebel forces. Assad's henchmen firebomb the village, destroying it and incinerating everyone except the girl, who is burned from head to toe and endures excruciating pain for three days before she dies. Suppose that we are deeply moved by this tragedy as we consider her unimaginable suffering and we remark, "How horrible. The little girl's suffering was a very bad thing."[7] When we say something like this, we ordinarily mean that the girl's suffering had a certain moral property:

that the suffering was bad. But according to emotivism, her suffering had no moral properties at all. When we comment on the girl's suffering, we are simply expressing our feelings; the suffering itself was neither good nor bad. But this view of things seems implausible. Our moral experience suggests that in fact some things are bad and some are good.

The philosopher Brand Blanshard (1892–1987) makes the point this way:

> [T]he emotivist is cut off by his theory from admitting that there has been anything good or evil in the past, either animal or human. There have been Black Deaths, to be sure, and wars and rumours of war; there have been the burning of countless women as witches, and the massacre in the Katlyn forest, and Oswiecim, and Dachau, and an unbearable procession of horrors; but one cannot meaningfully say that anything evil has ever happened. The people who suffered from these things did indeed take up attitudes of revulsion toward them; we can now judge that they took them; but in such judgments we are not saying that anything evil occurred. . . . [Emotivism], when first presented, has some plausibility. But when this is balanced against the implied unplausibility of setting down as meaningless every suggestion that good or evil events have ever occurred, it is outweighed enormously.[8]

Obviously, emotivism does not fare well when examined in light of our commonsense moral experience. We must keep in mind, though, that common sense is fallible. On the other hand, we should not jettison common sense in favor of another view unless we have good reasons to do so. In the case of emotivism, we have no good reasons to prefer it over common sense—and we have good grounds for rejecting it.

KEYWORDS

cultural relativism—The view that an action is morally right if one's culture approves of it.

emotivism—The view that moral utterances are neither true nor false but are expressions of emotions or attitudes.

objectivism—The view that some moral principles are valid for everyone.

subjective relativism—The view that an action is morally right if one approves of it.

EXERCISES

Review Questions

1. Does objectivism entail intolerance?
2. Does objectivism require absolutism?
3. How does subjective relativism differ from cultural relativism?
4. How does subjective relativism imply moral infallibility?
5. How does subjective relativism imply that disagreements cannot happen?
6. What is the argument for cultural relativism? Is it a valid argument?
7. Can cultural relativists consistently advocate tolerance? Why or why not?
8. What is the emotivist view of moral disagreements?
9. According to emotivism, how do reasons function in moral discourse?
10. Does the diversity of moral judgments in cultures show that right and wrong are determined by culture? Why or why not?

Essay Questions

1. Are you a subjective relativist? If so, what are your reasons for adopting this view? If not, why not?
2. Suppose a majority of the German people approved of Hitler's murdering six million Jews in World War II. Would this approval make Hitler's actions morally justified? If so, why? If not, why not—and what moral outlook are you using to make such a determination?
3. When cultural relativists say that every culture should embrace a policy of tolerance, are they contradicting themselves? If so, how? If cultural relativism were true, would this fact make wars between societies less or more likely? Explain.
4. According to a cultural relativist, would the civil rights reforms that Martin Luther King Jr. sought be morally right or wrong? Do *you* think that his efforts at reform were morally wrong? Why or why not?
5. If you traveled the world and saw that cultures differ dramatically in their moral judgments, would you conclude from this evidence that cultural relativism was true? Why or why not?
6. Suppose a serial killer approves of his murderous actions. According to subjective relativism, are the killer's actions therefore justified? Do *you* believe the serial killer's murders are justified? If not, is your judgment based on a subjective relativist's perspective or an objectivist perspective? Explain.
7. Are you a cultural relativist? Why or why not?

8. Suppose a deer that had been shot by a hunter writhed in agony for days before dying. You exclaim, "How she must have suffered! Her horrendous pain was a bad thing." In this situation, does the word *bad* refer to any moral properties? Is there really something bad about the deer's suffering—or is your use of the word just a way to express your horror without making any moral statement at all? Explain your answers.

ETHICAL DILEMMAS

1. In Western societies, some cultural subgroups believe it is morally permissible to kill anyone who criticizes their religion. Do you agree or disagree with this view? On what grounds? Is your position relativist or objectivist?
2. Suppose you are a social reformer campaigning against your culture's practice of systematically discriminating against the poorest people in your society. Do you think your stance is morally right—or is your culture right while you are wrong? Why?
3. Suppose you accept (approve of) premarital sex. Is it possible for you to be mistaken about this issue? Why or why not? Does your answer suggest that you are a subjective relativist?

Endnotes

1. Walter T. Stace, *The Concept of Morals* (1937; reprint, New York: Macmillan, 1965), 8–58.
2. Phillip Montague, "Are There Objective and Absolute Moral Standards?" in *Reason and Responsibility: Readings in Some Basic Problems in Philosophy,* 5th ed., ed. Joel Feinberg (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1978), 490–91.
3. Solomon Asch, *Social Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1952), 378–79.
4. See, for example, Clyde Kluckhohn, "Ethical Relativity: Sic et Non," *Journal of Philosophy* 52 (1955): 663–77, and E. O. Wilson, *On Human Nature* (1978; reprint, New York: Bantam, 1979).
5. A. J. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics and Theology," in *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936; reprint, New York: Dover, 1952), 107.
6. Ayer, "Critique of Ethics," 112.
7. This scenario is inspired by some of Brand Blanshard's examples from "Emotivism," in *Reason and Goodness* (1961; reprint, New York: G. Allen & Unwin, 1978).
8. Blanshard, "Emotivism," 204–5.